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BOOK R E V I E W S  
The Sociology of Science in Europe, edited by Robert K. Merton and Jerry 
Gaston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1977). 
This book covers more than the title indicates, since Robert Merton has used 
nearly a third of the space for "An Episodic Memoir" of his own impressions, 
contacts, and activities as the leading sociologist in our time. He has vividly 
described the origins, the antecedents, the invisible college phase, and the slow 
institutionalization of this new specialty. His episodes are dramatically ar- 
ranged around certain pioneers: Gilfillan, Ogburn, Price, Candolle, Galton, 
Garfield, Sarton, Popper, and Kuhn. Personally, I like best the work on scien- 
tists' biographies, initiated by Candolle and Galton, which involved eventually 
the analysis of entries in, for example, the British Dictionary of National 
Biography and the Dictionary of American Biography. Merton tends to say 
nothing of his own role, as he prefers to act as a participant observer of the 
specialty's development. He thereby frees himself to present his report as in- 
sider's information. He does, however (quite properly), present his own well- 
known conceptual framework which examines the normative and interaction- 
pattern features of the social and cultural structures of science. 
Merton's memoir is a fine piece of work, and is very necessary in this context 
because the sociology of science has too often remained confined within na- 
tional and/or disciplinary boundaries. Thus, his review of the sociology of 
science in Europe cannot omit a presentation of the international picture and 
those American scholars who have meant the most to the Europeans in the 
field. The balance of the book considers the sociology of science in Europe 
through seven essays on West Germany, Austria, Poland, Britain, France, 
Italy, the USSR, and Scandinavia. Rolf Klima and Ludger Viehoff, in their 
discussion of West Germany and Austria, give special attention to recent work 
such as Plessner's empirical stgdies of the German university system and the 
more speculative, historical tradition (Ben-David, for example) which examines 
the system of science with reference to German society. The discussion of the 
sociology of science in Poland (by Krauze, Kowalewski and Podg6recki) indi- 
cates that in this country the specialty is not yet well-institutionalized. There 
seems to be more orientation to science as such than to sociology. 
M. J. Mulkay's discussion of Britain's sociology of science centers on two 
broad topics: university research and work in industry and government. There 
are several useful reports here, such as Burns and Stalker's findings that further 
document the isolation and underutilization of scientists in business and in- 
dustry, and Cotgrove and Box's discussion of the differential commitments of 
scientists which prompt those more committed to salary, promotional, and 
other material rewards to seek careers in industry. Paul Frank (a pseudonym) 
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has examined four aspects of the French situation: the development of the 
research tradition in sociology, the relation between the development of dis- 
ciplines and their social organization (or their cognitive structures), the orga- 
nization of work laboratories, and the productivity of researchers. In France, 
organized social science research is conducted largely in research institutes 
outside the universities. Reliance on independent contractual support for re- 
search tends to create a pattern of small research units investigating narrowly 
pragmatic topics. Findings are commonly published in technical reports, not  
in scientific journals, with the result that researchers are deprived of visible 
prestige documentation necessary for promotion and recognition. Worse still, 
their research is defined by persons unfamiliar with the fundamentals of the 
social sciences. 
Filippo Barbano's account of Italian work stresses the socialization, speciali- 
zation, and activity structure features of science. He energetically discusses 
the dialectical structure of science's historical role in crystal-clear terms which 
were, to me, incomprehensible. The chapter by Gennady Dobrov on the soci- 
ology of science in the USSR focuses on science policy. He reminds us that 
as early as the first year of the Soviet state, Lenin organized and promoted the 
development of science, creating State agencies for scientific managment for 
the purpose of its application to social needs (such as electrification). The 
basic strategic doctrine was the transformation of research into a productive 
social force. Dobrov presents empirical support for his discussions of the devel- 
opment of scientific establishments and fields, the structure of controls, goals 
and means. One troubling feature of this article is that, in contrast to the 
others, it lacks a complete bibliography and, surprisingly, refers only to pub- 
lications in English (even in the case of texts in Russian journals). 
Jamison's discussion of Scandinavia pays special attention to the younger 
sociologists of science who are pictured as more or less totally integrated into 
the welfare system, practical minded, and interested in applications. He points 
out that the few remaining "basic" scientists seem to be more interested in 
establishing contacts with colleagues abroad than in developing a sense of 
community in their own countries. This does seem to be a trend throughout 
Europe where the large number of applied scientists, in contrast to their basic 
research colleagues, address themselves mostly to the public and their local 
scientific communities. 
Gunnar Boal t  
Stockholms Universitet 
For  Science in the Social  Sciences  by David Papineau (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1979). 
Most scientists would no doubt agree that methodology is what sets science 
apart from other modes of creative activity. Fewer would endorse the propo- 
sition that "the scientific method" is not absolute, but a shifting community 
standard, and only a cynical handful of practicing scientists would agree with 
Feyerabend that method is no standard at all. Since Kuhn, however, the role 
of methodology in scientific research has become a legitimate topic of debate, 
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first among philosophers and historians of science, and now among all who 
profess "objective knowledge" as their productive goal. That methodology is 
a range of choices instead of a fixed procedure, subject to national, epochal, 
and social influences, is hardly controversial any more. What remains arguable, 
indeed controversial, is precisely how the scientific method is interposed be- 
tween "an articulated reality 'out there'" (46) and a thinking, manipulating 
scientist "in here". For if method safeguards objectivity, then the means 
justifies the ends. Whatever we do to "measure," "retrieve," or "capture" 
reality determines our representations, that is, our claims to knowledge of it. 
This realistic-relativistic view of knowledge Papineau would not dispute. Yet 
it is a paradox to admit simultaneously a single external reality and multiple 
or alternative research programs for its apprehension. To adopt exclusively a 
realist or relativist stance, as shown recently by Elkana (Social Studies o f  
Science, 1978, 309-326) ,  is an unnecessary, if not fu}ile, epistemological 
choice. Seldom do natural scientists explicitly make such a choice; rather, 
they move silently back and forth between each in the process of doing 
research. Some social scientists consider this a pivotal process for developing 
a "sociology of scientific knowledge," a program that demystifies the work of 
mathematicians, physicists, and biologists. In so doing, this program approaches 
science as a problem in "negotiated order". How do scientists themselves in- 
terpret and socially construct reality? What, for example, constitute criteria 
6f proof for a particular research community at a particular time? How do 
these criteria change, affect the evaluation of knowledge claims, and crystallize 
the community 's  consensus, however fragile, to those claims? Without posing 
these questions, science seems aloof and impenetrable, an utterly rational sys- 
tem for the production of "privileged knowledge." 
For Science in the Social Sciences is dearly in this genre, although it is largely 
uninformed by its copious literature. This is disturbing and, at the same time, 
predictable. Philosophers of science rarely take their cues from sociologists 
(of whom many are by training, if not by self-identification). Papineau, how- 
ever, is no stranger to sociology. Perhaps his identification with both disci- 
plines engendered his interest in making the epistemological transition from 
methodology/objectivity in the natural sciences to methodology/objectivity 
in the social sciences. His interest, while noble and welcome, fails upon execu- 
tion to convince. Underlying the failure of For Science is what one might call 
a Kuhnian fallacy - an adaptation of the children's fable "The Little Engine 
That Could." The Kuhnian version - the pejorative eponymy may be un- 
deserved, though it acknowledges a debt to the heuristic value of The Struc- 
ture o f  Scientific Revolutions and the corpus it begat - is that the "little" 
and "immature" sciences, the social sciences, will experience paradigmatic 
maturation if they continue to emulate adherence to the canons of logic and 
scientific method (as exemplified by physics) and objectify their knowledge 
of what Papineau calls "deterministic causal relationships" within social 
reality (52, 162). The fallacy, of course, exists in the distinctive subject mat- 
ter of the social sciences. One can mathematize, construct deductive propo- 
sitional theories, and explain/ substantial variance in the social relations of 
groups, organizations, and less intuitive "structures" or "systems," and still 
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lack an understanding and a sense for the predictability of social behavior. 
Indeed, the myth of positivism is "to measure is to know" (but see 2, 20); if 
anything, the social sciences of late, particularly the disciplines of sociology 
and political science, have methodologized their subject matter without 
(much?) enhancing their explanatory or predictive powers. One social analyst 
(Ritzer, Sociology: A Multiple Paradigm Science, 1975) recognizing this 
realist-relativist "bind," has, in the name of Kuhn, consigned sociology to the 
status of a "multiple paradigm science". The pessimists among us might inter- 
pret this as resignation to an unending dissensus about what the subject matter 
of sociology should be, much less is. As for the opt imis ts . . .  
Reenter  For Science. In seven chapters and slightly less than 200 pages, we 
are reintroduced to "social facts," "causes and statistics," and "actions, rules 
and meanings". The heart of Papineau's thesis - "a defense of the view that 
the social sciences can and ought to conform to the standards set by the na- 
tural sciences" (1) - is contained in chapters 2, 6, and 7. Here, the respective 
discussions of "scientific theories," "alien belief systems," and "facts, values 
and ideology" are provocative and even compelling in spots. The review of 
Feyerabend, Kuhn, and Lakatos (33-43) ,  while grounded in a Popperian 
rational man characterization of the scientist that is becoming increasingly 
difficult to defend, is a concise analysis of the tension between theory-depen- 
dent observation and the prescriptive need for generalization and falsifiability. 
In a way, Papineau is engulfed by this tension, for he vacillates throughout 
the book between the classic "contextual" dichotomy of discovery and justi- 
fication. To wit: 
Philosophers in the Poppefian tradition.., see themselves as concerned solely with 
matters of justification, with questions of how scientific theories are to be assessed 
once they are actually put forward. Where the theories come from in the first place, 
how they are discovered, is presumed not to be a matter for philosophical evaluation 
but, if anything, something for social, psychological or psychoanalytic explanation. 
The idea is that, provided a theory is properly assessed after it is proposed, it is no 
discredit to it, that it might originally have occurred to its proponent because he found 
it ideologically attractive, or because it came to him in a dream (43). 
Like other intellectual divisions of labor decried as disciplinary ethnocentrism 
or parochialism (King, History and Theory, 1971, 3 -32 ) ,  the separation of 
discovery from justification as topics for social analysis is anathema to me. 
Because science is a symbolic social activity, the origins of ideas - as well as 
their negotiation, confirmation, rejection, and/or obsolescence - must be ap- 
praised together. Papinean eventually concedes this point, too: "There is little 
doubt that in actual'practice theoretical frameworks are not always given up 
when scientific standards finally call for them to be abandoned. Their attrac- 
tions to powerful social groups will often encourage their persistence well past 
this point. But, again, to say that existing practice falls short of what the 
canons of scientific methodology require is not  to say that ideological influ- 
ence must obtrude on scientific requirements" (175). Finally, seemingly con- 
tradicting his thesis, Papineau admits that in the social sciences "ideological 
pressures will almost invariably be present. By the nature of their subject mat- 
ter the claims made by theories in the social sciences cannot help but be about 
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the  empir ica l  c o n n e c t i o n s  b e t w e e n  var ious  s ta tes  of  affairs t h a t  d i f f e ren t  
groups  will be in t e re s t ed  in preserving or  p r e v e n t i n g "  (176) .  If we cons ider  
these  j u x t a p o s e d  s t a t e m e n t s  in f u r t h e r  detail ,  we are assured t h a t  "sc ience  is 
still essent ial ly  a critical act ivi ty .  Scient is ts  recognize  an ob l iga t ion  to a c c o u n t  
for  anomal ies  in n o n - a d  hoc ways,  by  p r o d u c i n g  exp lana t ions  which  are t h e m -  
selves f u r t h e r  t e s t ab l e "  (155) .  
In general actually adopting (as opposed to merely professing) beliefs which lack 
evidence can only be self-defeating. For one's actions best lead to the satisfaction of 
one's ends if they are based on accurate beliefs about what is in fact conducive to 
those ends . . . .  A belief, even if adopted for ideological reasons, is a claim as to the 
facts, and as such needs to be assessed for correctness against the empirical evidence 
(172-173) .  
U l t ima te ly ,  wha t  is missing f rom Pap ineau ' s  an th ropo log ica l  a c c o u n t  of  
science is a recourse  to  a l te rna t ive  realities. Having pe r suaded  the  reader  t h a t  
" a l t e rna t ive  r a t iona l i t i e s "  and  " d i f f e r e n t  be l ief  s y s t e m s "  are marks  of  concep-  
tual ,  l inguist ic ,  and  cu l tura l  d i s t inc t ion ,  the  n e x t  step toward  a t h o r o u g h l y  
relat ivis t ic  r ecogn i t ion  of  a l te rna t ive  ( i n t e rp re t a t i ons  of)  real i t ies  would  be 
expec ted .  Ins tead ,  Pap ineau  re t rea t s :  
. . . i n  the end there are real obstacles to an entirely value-free social science. But it 
should not be forgotten that, as before, the issue is essentially an empirical one: we 
are asking what conditions, if any, will as a matter of practical fact prevent ideological 
influences illegitimately distorting accepted views of social reality. And so, even a 
pessimistic answer does not affect the normative point that it would still be better for 
people to accept those views that most accurately represent reality rather than those 
views which unnecessarily distort it. In particular; anybody who is serious about dis- 
puting the accepted orthodoxy on some matter will still have an obligation to vindi- 
cate his scepticism by producing an alternative which can in time actually be shown 
to be scientifically superior (177, italics added). 
I t  is i ndeed  f i t t ing  t ha t  the  f inal  sect ion of  For Science (which  immed ia t e ly  
fol lows this  q u o t a t i o n )  is en t i t l ed  "Sc ience  as Ideo logy" .  (I t  comes,  for  me,  
at  leas t  one  pa rag raph  t oo  la te . )  The i ta l ic ized words  above  are m e a n t  to  in-  
dicate  the  value- laden cha rac te r  of  P a p i n e a u ' s  own  views. Like p regnancy ,  
va lue- f reedom in social science is n o t  a f rac t iona l  s ta te ;  social science is no t  
value free. Similar ly ,  t he  " i s sue"  is ep is temologica l  n o t  " e m p i r i c a l " ;  t he  
" n o r m a t i v e  p o i n t "  - so famil iar  to  sociologists  of  science like myse l f  - is 
t ha t  wha t  is " b e t t e r "  is suf f ic ient ly  u n o r t h o d o x  so t h a t  fulf i l l ing the  "obl iga-  
t ion  to v i n d i c a t e "  skept ic i sm is t a n t a m o u n t  to  heresy .  In shor t ,  the  reigning 
ideo logy ,  c lo thed  in theore t i ca l  and  m e t hodo l og i ca l  p rescr ip t ions ,  de t e rmines  
w h a t  is "sc ient i f ica l ly  super io r " .  Only  a sociology of  science t h a t  rejoins a 
realist ic,  skept ica l  sociology of  knowledge  will reveal  the  a l te rna t ive  real i t ies  
d i s to r t ed  and  obscured  by  specific scient i f ic  theor ies  and  m e t h o d s .  This  is my 
epis temologica l  fable.  It  unde r sco res  w h a t  is missing f rom Pap ineau ' s  accoun t :  
a c o m p r e h e n s i o n  of  w h a t  "Cr i t ica l  T h e o r y "  (181 )  is and  can do. " T e c h n i c a l  
i n t e r e s t s "  and  h u m a n i t y  ( inc luding  h u m a n  subjec t iv i ty )  need  n o t  be incon-  
g ruen t ;  the re  is an in te l l ec tua l  and  t he r eby  h u m a n  fail ing - n o  worse t han  
Pap ineau ' s  in For Science. As you  read the  book ,  cons ider  i t  a r e m i n d e r  t h a t  
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we all could do better and that - relativistically and realistically - some of us 
scientists are trying. 
Daryl E. Chubin 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
The Revisionists Revised: A Critique o f  the Radical At tack on the Schools 
by Diane Ravitch (New York: Basic Books, 1977). 
In The Revisionists Revised, Diane Ravitch attacks and attempts to discredit 
the work of several scholars who have questioned the efficacy and potential 
of schooling to advance egalitarian and progressive ends within the American 
capitalist order. Ravitch contends that "radical" or "revisionist" critics, in- 
cluding Michael Katz, Samuel Bowles, Herbert Gintis, Clarence Karier, Joel 
Spring, and Walter Feinberg, advance alien and dangerous political values, 
apply crude and simplistic analyses, and selectively choose from and distort 
otherwise scanty evidence. The Revisionists Revised should be soundly rejected 
on some of these very same grounds. 
Ravitch presents a simplistic, schoolbook version of American history and 
social change; she misreports and misunderstands much from the works she 
reviews; she selectively uses social science evidence drawn uncritically from 
secondary sources; and she betrays an appalling lack of academic ethics. 
Through literary device, caricature of competing ideologies, and outright dis- 
tortion, Ravitch attempts to place radical scholarship outside the boundaries 
of acceptable discourse and to taint radical scholars with undemocratic, even 
totalitarian sympathies. The Revisionists Revised is not primarily an exercise 
in serious scholarship and argument. It is ultimately addressed to beleaguered 
government officials, educational professionals, and citizens whose frustrations 
and low morale Ravitch is attempting to alleviate. In pursuit of this end, 
Ravitch adopts tactics that should be repugnant to those who hold to the 
liberal values she pretends to defend. 
Radical interpretation, in Ravitch's view, is an assault on institutions and 
values which she prizes. She subtitles her book, "A Critique of the Radical 
Attack on the Schools." Chapter one is called "The Democratic-Liberal 
Tradition Under Attack." In this chapter, Ravitch contrasts a presumably 
open and responsible politics characteristic of the United States with the sup- 
posed radical alternative. Radicals, st'/e says, demonstrate an "exclusive pre- 
occupation with ends as contrasted with means and ends in relation." In 
chapter three, recent radical scholarship is introduced with an attack on 1960s 
New Left activism, characterized as indifferent to means and approving of 
violence. Quite apart from their validity as descriptions of radical politics, 
Ravitch's characterizations are irrelevant to the validity of critical interpreta- 
tions of the American past, and are unfaithful to the work and personal 
commitments of the authors under review. Conceding that none of the books 
she examines "can be said to be a systematic application of New Left thinking," 
the context and manner in which Ravitch situates her subjects make unmis- 
takable the intended connection between radical analysis and undemocratic 
behavior. 
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Ravitch's attempt to taint radical scholars with undemocratic affections is 
clearest in her treatment of Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis. Ravitch writes 
that the authors of Schooling in Capitalist America "call their revolution 
'socialist' and 'democratic', but their referents are never socialist democracies 
like Sweden or Israel. Instead, they hail the revolutionary 'socialism' of such 
nations as the Soviet Union, North Vietnam, Cuba, and China . . . .  [A]nyone 
acquainted with the societies lauded by the authors must feel some skepticism 
about the claims of greater personal freedom in Marxist 'democracies ' . . . .  
[O]ne might Wish that the authors showed some slight appreciation of the de- 
mocraticqiberal values that preserve their freedom to publish a call to revolu- 
tion against democratic liberalism." Ravitch is correct that Bowles and Gintis do 
not  advance Israel and Sweden as exemplars. They also believe that progressive 
forces have been unleashed by violent revolutions, including those in France, 
Russia, China, Cuba, and the United States. But Bowles and Gintis plainly 
and forcefully reject nondemocratic societies as objects of emulation, a fact 
which Ravitch omits to report. 
Not only does Ravitch distort the political values of her subjects, but also 
their substantive analyses. She alleges that a fundamental contention common 
to the authors she examines is that the form and outcomes of American 
education are to be attributed to the unworthy intentions and motives of 
individual educational reformers and members of economic ~lites. "[T]he 
radical historians," Ravitch writes, "assert that the liberal's promotion of 
schooling was intended to divert attention from more salient issues" (original 
emphasis). Revisionist scholars share a "belief that schools were consciously 
designed by liberal reformers as undemocratic instruments of manipulation 
and control," and they "share the opinion that American schools have been 
an intentional, purposeful failure" (original emphasis). These assertions are 
largely untrue. Following Ravitch's footnotes and examining at length several 
of the books she reviews, one finds little evidence that malevolent or deceitful 
intention on the part of reformers or 4lites plays an important explanatory 
role in the revisionists' accounts. Instead, one generally finds either explicit 
disclaimers to the contrary, or arguments which impute underlying systemic 
purpose to recurring and enduring patterns of outcomes, but which eschew 
placing blame on individuals. 
Ravitch's mistaken emphasis on the question of intention and motivation de- 
rives from her adherence to a superficial and trivial conception of social class 
analysis. For Ravitch, class analysis reduces to correlating individual actions 
with the clearsighted pursuit of economic self-interest on the part of self- 
conscious members of a rigid stratification order. Because she believes that 
social mobility is the norm, that position in the United States is defined by 
multiple and cross-cutting dimensions, that Americans almost universally re- 
gard themselves as middle-class, that overt class consciousness and antagonism 
are minimal, and that economic self4nterest is not  readily apparent, Ravitch 
concludes that class analysis is of little value in understanding American 
education. 
Class analysis of the sort Ravitch defines is, indeed, of limited value. It is also 
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not the form of analysis usually applied in the studies under review. For ex- 
ample, Michael Katz, in The Irony of  Early School Reform, stresses the am- 
bivalent and uncertain perceptions and responses of social dlites to ante-bellum 
industrialization, and highlights the non-economic sources of tension under- 
lying the protests of striking shoemakers. In Class, Bureaucracy, and Schools, 
Katz rejects the argument that business 61ites were directly responsible for 
transforming early twentieth century urban schools, and argues that while 
" I t ]he  politics of organization-building was the politics of value clash, . . .  
the nature of that clash is not  described by conventional categories of eco- 
nomic or class division" (original emphasis). Even Colin Greet, whose book 
The Great School Legend is the weakest of the works Ravitch treats, rejects 
the direct pursuit of profit as the force behind eductional change, and Clarence 
Karier takes pains to note of the contributors to Roots of Crisis, " n o n e . . .  
accept an economic deterministic position." 
In Ravitch's perspective, domination arises solely from the efforts of one group 
to knowingly subjugate and exploit another, never out of well-intentioned 
responses to dislocation and change, nor out of unquestioned social arrange- 
ments. Class struggle does not  exist unless it is recognized and named as such. 
The apparently universal faith in schooling precludes the possibility that 
schooling is an instrument of class imposition. That individuals seek more 
schooling because systemic constraints restrict alternative avenues to economic 
security is not  a possibility Ravitch recognizes. The assumptions Ravitch asso- 
ciates with class analysis deserve comment,  for, even if true, they do not war- 
rant her dismissal of class as a central concern. The overwhelming majority of 
Americans who work do so as employees. This means that most bosses them- 
selves have a boss, that many workers exercise at least some supervisory au- 
thority, and, in large firms, all are governed by "company policy". Conse- 
quently, few Americans have direct contact with capitalists, and the immediate 
interests of workers at differing levels often conflict. The invisibility of the 
capitalist class and the internal stratification of workers may help to explain 
the relative absence of explicitly class-based party politics in the United States. 
If this is so, one should want to inquire into the role of schooling in contri- 
buting to the invisibility of the capitalist class and, as Bowles and Gintis do, 
into the role of schooling in preparing students for jobs and careers in a highly 
stratified and fragmented work structure. 
That most Americans regard themselves as middle-class should be a source of 
some puzzlement. According to sociologists Richard Coleman, Lee Rainwater, 
and Kent McClleland, in their recent book Social Standing in America, 
Americans tend strongly to equate social class with a continuum of social 
statuses defined principally by income levels and their associated standards of 
living. (This is not  the definition of class marxists employ. The reasons that, 
in Coleman et al.'s words, most people's "interest is mainly in who gets what 
and only derivatively in how they get it" require investigation.) Even if we 
agree with Ravitch that there has been some movement toward more equal 
family incomes in the post-World War II period, that movement most certainly 
has not b e e n  great. Ravitch exaggerates the degree of relevant change by 
adopting the questionable results advanced by the economist Morton Paglin, 
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and by adopting official government definitions of poverty,  which ignore the 
effects of  income gains among the nonpoor  in perpetuating the relative disad- 
vantage of low income recipients. "Relative pover ty"  shows no decline during 
the War on Poverty period. Despite large, continuing inequalities in income, 
Coleman et al. report  that  Americans imagine the middle classes to be increasing 
in size and drawing closer to those at the upper levels. The frequency of 
middle-class self-identification Ravitch notes is consistent with this finding, 
and like it, requires investigation and explanation. 
Ravitch assumes that the validity of social class analyses is vitiated in the face 
of widespread upward changes in occupations across generations. As Ravitch 
notes, such changes may be the result of the disappearance of  "bad"  jobs and 
the creation of  more " g o o d ' j o b s .  She does not  note that this kind of  mobil i ty 
can occur even when social origins strongly influence occupational destina- 
tions and when changes bring no relative gains. Indeed, Mary Corcoran and 
Christopher Jencks, two of  the co-authors of a new study of the determinants 
of economic success, Who Gets Ahead?, estimate that the correlation between 
a man's occupational status and combined measurable aspects of his back- 
ground (e.g., father's occupation, parental education, race) in the United 
States today may be as high as 0.64. If Ravitch is remiss in neglecting empiri- 
cal inequalities in life-chances, an even more serious omission in her work is 
the neglect of the conceptual ties between rates of  social mobil i ty and the 
nature of social class relations. In this, she is joined by those she criticizes. 
While the study of the dimensions and mechanisms of social mobil i ty is rele- 
vant to understanding the replenishment and reproduction of existing hier- 
archies, its relevance to understanding the causes of changes in the forms 
of hierarchies, in social relations of production,  and in the composition and 
strength of antagonistic classes is uncertain and largely unexplored. 
Schooling plays a major role in beliefs about social mobili ty.  Not surprisingly, 
Ravitch devotes considerable effort toward portraying education as an effec- 
tive and accessible means for undoing the disadvantages of  lowly origins. The 
picture she presents is exaggerated and biased. For  example, she cites William 
Sewell's follow-up studies of Wisconsin high school students as showing that 
socioeconomic factors explain only a small proport ion of individual differences 
in educational attainment.  Ravitch fails to note that the Wisconsin sample 
began with only high school seniors. Because early school leaving is related to 
background factors, these data inevitably underestimate their effects. Recent 
nationally representative data, on which Ravitch draws for other purposes, 
show that among males, socioeconomic background is at least twice as impor- 
tant  in explaining educational differences as the Wisconsin data would imply. 
Ravitch emphasizes the importance of schooling for promoting economic 
equality between races. She notes that a college education returns higher 
benefits to young blacks than to young whites, and that most of the occupa- 
tional gains made by blacks between 1962 and 1973 occurred because of in- 
creased educational attainment.  From facts such as these, Ravitch confidently 
concludes that "a democratic society can bring about  effective social change, 
if there are both the leadership and the political commitment  to do so." Less 
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optimistic interpretations are possible. The reason that college is more valuable 
to blacks than to whites is that whites who have only a high school education 
are far more likely than similar blacks to hold decent, well-paying jobs. The 
severe disadvantage of the black high school graduate, not  the special advan- 
tage of the black collegian, explains the value of a college education to blacks. 
Moreover, reflecting on similar findings, David Featherman and Robert Hauser, 
in Opportunity and Change, warn that "if younger blacks follow the pattern of 
their predecessors, the apparent gains on their white counterparts may prove 
temporary." The fact that the majority of occupational gains made by blacks 
over a decade's time occurred through lengthier schooling suggests the impor- 
tance of continuing racial disparities among men with the same amount of 
schooling. This is especially important when earnings are considered. Joseph 
Schwartz and Jill Williams, also co-authors of Who Gets Ahead?, have shown 
that giving nonwhites the same amount of schooling as whites could be ex- 
pected to reduce the racial gap in earnings by at most 30 percent. Simply 
paying whites and nonwhites with the same schooling equal amounts might 
reduce the earnings by as much as 70 percent. Contrary to Ravitch's claims, 
education is a rather weak antidote to racism in the labor market. Her treat- 
ment of income inequality, social mobility, and the determinants and con- 
sequences of schooling reveal Ravitch to be an amateur in the social sciences. 
She is captive of the researchers upon whose work she draws, and is unable to 
discern complexities or to introduce methodological and interpretive qualifi- 
cations of her own. In its weaknesses, Ravitch's treatment of these issues is of 
a piece with the remainder of her book. 
To reject Ravitch's work is not  to uncritically endorse the works she reviews. 
Critics from within the revisionist camp itself, such as Carl Kaestle and Marvin 
Lazerson, raised serious questions about some of their colleagues' work long 
before Ravitch took up her task. (Curiously, on the strange grounds that 
"[w]hile the work of these historians includes some of the radical themes, 
each has criticized central elements of the radical analysis," Ravitch exempts 
Kaestle and Lazerson, as well as David Tyack, from her own consideration. 
It would appear that Ravitch refuses to risk lending the revisionist school any 
legitimacy by including within it scholars whom she deems respectable.) 
Certainly, the effort to develop a critical history and sociology of education 
would benefit from the more explicit and systematic application of well- 
established theoretical frameworks. It would benefit as well from a less overt 
emphasis on de-mythologizing popular beliefs about schooling. This orienta- 
tion leads to exaggeration and to quarrels over nonessentials. It should not  
be necessary, for example, to refute the liberal's model of a "meritocracy" 
in each of its empirical particulars in order to validate a marxist perspective. 
This is part of the effort Bowles and Gintis undertake, and their results are 
not persuasive. Finally, the revisionist perspective would benefit from height- 
ened  sensitivity to the distinction between functions and causes. Too often, 
the revisionists appear to forget Durkheim's observation that " [ t ]he  need we 
have of things cannot give them existence, nor can it confer their specific 
nature upon them." The real shortcomings in the revisionists' work cannot, 
however, justify the slander, polemics, and thin analysis offered in The 
Revisionists Revised. 
Michael R. Olneck 
University of Wisconsin-Madison 
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The Political Economy of  Human Rights by Noam Chomsky and Edward S. 
Herman, 2 vols. (Boston: South End Press, 1979). 
Dependent Development by Peter Evans (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1979). 
Whither Brazil, and whither its analysis of Brazil? Routinely mentioned now 
in conventional media and social science as the most advanced and promising 
of the so-called emerging nations, Brazil's trajectory in the last fifteen years 
has been held up as an example of what capitalism can do, for better and for 
worse. Some observers focus on the astonishing economic growth rate, some 
on the deepening of the accumulation process, some on the state's role in that 
process, some on the new expansion into the Amazon, some on the continuing 
wretchedness of the Northeast. Some focus on the widening gap between rich 
and poor, some on military and police repression and the reemergence of civil- 
ian politics, some on the expanded Brazilian role in world politics and trade. 
No work I know of has captured all of these aspects in what seem the right 
proportions, and I am not  about to attempt such a synthesis here. Rather, I 
consider two new (and contrasting) treatments of the Brazilian situation, 
focused on different aspects, but each in its own way calling into question 
the practice of conceiving of Brazil as a model for other Third World countries. 
The first volume of Chomsky and Herman's The Political Economy of  Human 
Rights, entitled The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism, is 
more valuable politically than as social science, and its portrayal of Brazil as 
an example of "Third World fascism" or "client fascism" is one reason for 
that opinion. Evans's Dependent Development, subtitled The Alliance of  
Multinational, State, and Local Capital in Brazil, works out some of the insti- 
tutional economic arrangements that distinguish Brazil and a handful of other 
semi-peripheral countries from the relatively weaker and poorer periphery. 
Evans is thus much clearer both about the limitations of his theoretical model 
in accounting for Brazil's dependent development and about the limitations 
of Brazilian actuality as a model for other countries. 
Before discussing these works in detail, two general issues require comment: 
(1) the two usages of the term "model";  and (2) the dual purpose of social 
science. As suggested above, the term "model" is used in two quite distinct 
ways in macrosociology. On the one hand, "model" refers to concrete examples 
in the phenomenal world, examples which might be followed by others: the 
Prussian road, the Soviet model, the Chinese model, and so forth. On the other 
hand, "model" refers to abstract depictions (usually partial) of that phenom- 
enal world. Insofar as the Brazilian experience since 1964 has been an empiri- 
cal model, it has been a failure. Over the past seven years, the Pinochet regime 
in Chile has attempted to recreate the so-called Brazilian miracle by combining 
terrifying repression and open invitations to multinational capital. The result 
has been far short of miraculous, even from the regime's standpoint: industrial 
stagnation, dynamism only in the primary export sector, exodus of skilled 
and professional workers, low levels of foreign investment. The story in 
Uruguay since 1971 is much the same. A model that cannot be copied is not  
a model, but a phantasm. As for abstract depictions of Brazilian development, 
quite a number have gained currency in the last decade, all of them capturing 
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aspects of that development. O'Donnell 's "bureaucratic authoritarianism," 
Schmitter's "corporatism," Fernandes's "bourgeois autocracy," Cardoso and 
Faletto's "associated dependent development," and Marini's "sub-imperialism" 
all contribute to a sophisticated picture. But whereas Chomsky and Herman 
add only "the Washington connection" to O'Donnell by their focus on repres- 
sion, Evans enriches the Cardoso/Faletto depiction in two ways. First, he 
fleshes out the structure through which multinational firms, Brazilian enter- 
prises, and state agencies antagonistically cooperate. Second, by moving a 
good part of the way toward applying Wallerstein's concept of "semi-peripheral 
states" in his concluding comparisons of Brazil with Mexico and Nigeria 
(although unaccountably not with Argentina), he specifies and delimits the 
applicability of his own model of the triple alliance. 
This leads to the second general point, the two intellectual tasks of social sci- 
ence. The first task is to identify essences, to name, define, and characterize 
material and social relationships. The second is to explain variation. Most 
social science necessarily does some of each, although routine social science, 
in Kuhn's sense, simply assumes through its use of terms and concepts that 
the essences have already been properly identified. Conversely, most ideologi- 
cal struggle among social scientists focuses precisely on questions of essence 
rather than variation (e.g., status versus class, norms versus material structures). 
Stinchcombe thinks that identifying essences is either ritual totemism or irrel- 
evant baggage, and that explaining variation is all that matters, all that distin- 
guishes strong social science from weak. But in my view the two tasks are 
connected, because the better one's identification of essences, the more likely 
one is to be able to account for variation. This is particularly true for routine 
social scientists. And insofar as social science is inescapably political, getting 
the names right is half the battle. Chomsky and Herman's book is limited 
because they are not interested in variation, but only in documenting an im- 
portant essence of Third World reality, namely brutal repression with US aid, 
connivance, and misrepresentation. Evans by contrast cares both  about an es- 
sence - industrial development - and about variation - more  or less industrial 
development in different countries. This interest in explaining variation 
enables him to define clearly the configuration he finds in Brazil's economic 
institutions/ 
Chomsky and Herman's basic thesis in their first volume is that "under fre- 
quent U.S. sponsorship, the neo-fascist National Security State and other 
forms of authoritarian rule have become the dominant mode of government 
in the Third World" (8). An essence is posited, with two aspects: terrorism 
by the state in the form of torture and genocide, and a massive US presence 
in promoting, supplying, condoning, and downplaying or misrepresenting that 
terrorism. Numerous instances of this essence are then described: East Pakistan, 
Burundi, Paraguay, Brazil, East Timor, Indonesia, .Thailand, the Philippines, 
the Dominican Republic, Chile, Argentina, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and the 
various Indochinese countries. There is a basic truth here, a monstrously 
important truth, usefully catalogued and righteously denounced. In the post- 
World War II period the United States has been the major purveyor of terror 
in the world; in Chomsky and Herman's language, "Wash ing ton  has become  
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the torture and political murder capital o f  the world" (16, italics theirs). This 
is amply documented by Michael Klare, whose indispensable labors the au- 
thors amply draw upon. Furthermore, no satisfactory holistic account of the 
recent Brazilian trajectory is possible if it slights the use of repressive violence 
against the left and the use of genocidal violence against the indigenous popu- 
lation. Nor would such an account be complete without exploring Brazil's 
role as what Chomsky and Herman call the "torture-aid subcontractor" for 
Latin America. Finally, there is no gainsaying that state-initiated repressive 
violence "has a functional relationship to investment climate" (54, italics 
theirs). Insofar as there is any economics in Chomsky and Herman's "political 
economy of human rights," this is it. 
If one, however, is interested in variation as well as essence, Chomsky and 
Herman are not  particularly helpful. They organize much of their book around 
a distinction between "benign" and "constructive" terror, the difference pre- 
sumably being Washington's degree of approval. These contrast with "blood- 
baths" and other heinous forms of Communist terror which so preoccupy 
US officials and journalists. Chomsky the linguist quite properly turns on its 
head the everyday usage of a term reserved for the Palestinians and Vietnamese. 
But there is no consistent analytical thread here: both anti-communism and 
the desire for investment and trade opportunities motivate the US in sup- 
porting and]or justifying all this benign and constructive violence, and the au- 
thors attempt neither to connect different sorts of US interests to different 
kinds and amounts of terror, nor to connect these latter to different political 
and economic outcomes. One could plausibly assert, for example, that in large 
measure the relative absence of US economic interests led to the wanton dev- 
astation of Laos and Cambodia. One could add to such an account Franz 
Schurmann's subtle analysis of bureaucratic trade-offs in his sadly neglected 
Logic o f  World Power: the unrestricted Air Force and Navy bombers had a 
green light denied them over the more politically sensitive Vietnamese terrain. 
Because they are interested in essences rather than variation, Chomsky and 
Herman's rendering of Brazilian "subfascism" is superficial and in places mis- 
leading. First, they place such emphasis on the US role in subverting Brazilian 
democracy in the early 1960s that they slight the activity of the Brazilian right 
in general and the military in particular. This giyes an impression of US impe- 
rialist omnipotence, when in fact the Brazilians have used the US as much as 
the other way around, if not  more. Second, the characterization of Brazil's 
"denationalized client fascist elite" as "devoid of any economic ideas of their 
own," as engaged in "dogmatic adherence to free enterprise," as "economically 
illiterate" (25), is simply far-fetched. Diemists and Mobutuites, perhaps; 
Brazilian generals and technocrats, hardly. Or again, to say that those generals 
are "visionless creatures of U.S. imperial policy aping their masters" (103), is 
to miss the consciously nationalist self-strengthening activities that would 
enable the Brazilian government to tell President Carter in 1978 to peddle 
his human rights pieties elsewhere. Third, there is no dynamism in Chomsky 
and Herman's model, no tension or contradiction, but rather a super-abundant 
moralizing. They speak of an "expanding empire of violence" (9) when events 
in Iran and Nicaragua, not  to mention Zimbabwe or the US defeat in Indochina, 
suggest that there are strong counterforces at work in the world. Not the least 
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of those forces exist at the present time in Brazil, where the conjuncturally 
specific job of repressive violence - I am not one of those who thinks it 
greatly inappropriate to call it fascist - has quite possibly been done. In fact, 
the time may be ripe for further openings toward a more democratic politics 
as one way out of the current stagnation. 
Chomsky and Herman have written a painful political tract about "the sun 
and its planets" (frontispiece), the US and its clients. Its strength as an outraged 
correcting of the official and journalistic rhetoric is at the .same time its weak- 
ness as social science: it largely remains at the level of discourse used by the 
authors' political opponents. It names and defines an essence all too frequently 
missing from current social science analysis of the Third World. But in so 
doing, it fails even to suggest reasons for the variations in "fascism," as exem- 
plified in its failure to provide more than an extremely rudimentary model 
for comprehending Brazil. 
Evans's Dependent Development is by contrast attuned both to essence and 
variation. It thereby provides a useful model, not  of Brazil as a whole, but of 
the organization of the three major economic actors: multinational firms, 
local capital, and state actors. An introductory discussion of dependency 
theory from Baran and Furtado to Amin and O'Donnell introduces that trio 
theoretically, recapitulating the idea that military rule is necessary for the re- 
pression of the previously mobilized and organized urban working class, which 
is in turn necessary for moving beyond easy import substitution to heavy 
industrialization. A long second chapter discusses the transition from periphery 
to semi-periphery, in Evans's language, from "classic dependence" to "depen- 
dent development". Then follow several case studies of the competition and 
bargaining among the three factions of capital in various sectors: the multi- 
nationals and the national bourgeoisie in pharmaceuticals and textiles; the 
multinationals and the state in research and development; all three in steel, 
petrochemicals, and metals. A final chapter attempts to put the whole model 
in perspective, in part by comparing Brazil to Mexico and to Nigeria. Two 
questions thus animate Evans's book: what are the origins and limits of depen- 
dent development, and what are the institutional mechanisms through which 
it works? To take the second question first, Evans shows convincingly that 
"the global rationality of the multinationals" detracts "from their natural 
[sic] contribution to local accumulation," but that this "contradiction" is 
"resolvable by bargaining" (276), bargaining which cumulates over time. The 
outcomes of such bargaining vary "by industry and by issue" (277), but local 
capital - the famous national bourgeoisie - is by no means dead, having de- 
cided advantages "in situations where integration with the local social struc- 
ture [is] the key to business success" (281). "The weakest of the three part- 
ners" (280), local capital has yet shown considerable vitality and entrepre- 
neurship. As for the state, its central role in promoting accumulation is amply 
documented, but the case studies also show that because state enterprise 
managers share conventional corporate ideology, their activities are not  always 
consistent with overall state policy. The case studies and especially Evans's 
discussion of their implications (275--290) repay careful attention, including 
his penultimate warning that the "vulnerability" of Brazilian accumulation to 
"disruptions in the international economy constitutes the most obvious limi- 
tation of the triple alliance" (290). 
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Evans's answer to the first question, about the origins and limits of dependent  
development, also makes an important  contribution,  by specifying the appli- 
cability of his triple alliance model  to semi-peripheral countries. Here I find 
Evans caught half-way between the conventional "developmentalist"  perspec- 
tive that still holds sway in most studies of "nat ional"  industrialization 
(marxist or otherwise) and the emerging world-systems perspective. To judge 
from the organization of the book,  he began his work as a developmentalist 
and came to see the conceptual advantage of the semi-periphery as he was 
finishing it. This is highlighted in his concluding comparison of Brazil both 
with Mexico, where the parallels are great, and with Nigeria, where the petro- 
leum boom has paid for an increasingly strong state now in the process of 
orchestrating a triple alliance. Although he is not  explicit about it, Evans's 
account of Brazil's transition from periphery ("classic dependence")  to semi- 
periphery ("dependent  development")  also exemplifies the advantages of a 
world-systemic view, especially as his data contradict  the "developmental is t"  
theoretical statement with which he begins: "Classic dependence . . ,  created 
forces of product ion and social groups that eventually transformed it into a 
very different kind of political economy"  (56). The linchpin of his argument 
about the transition is the shift from Great Britain to the United States as 
the major source of foreign capital (76): US capital was never much invested 
in Brazilian primary exports and went heavily into industry. Furthermore,  
US-German rivalry before World War II gave the Vargas government leverage 
to gain financing for state-owned steel works (88 -89 ) ,  and both rivalry with 
and imitat ion of Argentina - Evans somewhat downplays this aspect - 
pushed the Brazilian military to pressure for both steel and petroleum pro- 
duction (90). To this one may add such better-known facts as the world 
depression-induced spur to import  substi tution, the World War II boom, and 
the outward push of US capital. Thus it is incorrect for Evans to claim that 
classic dependence was a "self-transforming" system (94): his analysis shows 
quite clearly that Brazil was and is part  of a larger, truly self-transforming 
system, the capitalist world-system. 
This brings me back to the present, to the limits of  the current arrangements 
in Brazil, to the questions of essence and variation, of  Brazil as a model, and 
of models of Brazil. Evans is quite clear that dependent development has 
reached a critical point,  espdcially given the world economic slowdown, with 
capital and intermediate goods imports rising faster than exports,  creating 
mounting indebtedness. He usefully points to the three Brazilian strategies 
of export  expansion, all of which in combination will help somewhat: renewed 
classical dependence through primary exports,  subimperialism through exports 
of manufactured goods to the periphery; and export  platform manufacturing 
for the core. The competitive success of these exports requires that Brazilian 
wages be kept low, ye t  to increase the size of  the Brazilian national market  
would require that s o m e  workers '  wages be raised. Unfortunately,  Evans does 
not  explore the political possibilities through which this structural contradic- 
tion will or will not  be overcome, concluding merely that for dependent 
development to continue core capitalists will have to keep up the i r  end of the 
multinational alliance against the potential  resistance of neo-protectionists 
and endangered workers. Evans's "triple alliance" model  then is a helpfully 
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accurate representation of Brazil in part because his interest in both variation 
and essence leads him to see Brazil itself as a model for only a few Third World 
semi-peripheral states, rather than as an instance of some fascistic essence. 
Perfectly aware that accumulation has thus far required exclusion of the mass 
of the population from welfare and politics, Evans,like Chomsky and Herman, 
has perhaps underestimated the chances for greater political and material 
inclusion of parts of the working class. For the members of the triple alliance 
there are obvious risks in such a change, hence the hesitancy with which 
democratic openings have been broached in the last few years. Unfortunately, 
Evans so concentrates on economic institutions that one cannot learn from 
his book how united or cohesive the Brazilian bourgeoisie really is, how likely 
it is to try to combine internal with export expansion. 
Chomsky and Herman call attention to numerous examples of repressive and 
genocidal states in the Third World, all supported in one way or another by 
the US. The absence of a political dialectic, the lack of any serious economic 
analysis, and their innocence of comparative method greatly detract from the 
scientific value of their work, a political compilation which must not  be ig- 
nored. Evans's sociological analysis of economic institutions in Brazilian 
industry and his comparisons of Brazil to other semi-peripheral states make a 
scientific contribution with political lessons for those who wholesale this or 
that model of revolution as promiscuously as conventional social scientists 
wholesale this or that model of modernization, dependence, or class struggle. 
One wishes for more books like his, but with more explicit attention to the 
political aspects of world capitalism as well. 
Walter L. Goldfrank 
University of California, Santa Cruz 
20th Century Gothic: America's Nixon by Sherri Cavan (San Francisco: Wigan 
Pier Press, 1979). 
Evil, visions of evil, and illusions of evil reverberate throughout this ambitious 
study of Nixon as cultural phenomenon. Professor Cavan, in publishing 20th 
Century Gothic herself, demonstrates that at least one kind of evil, the corpo- 
rate strar/glehold on publishing, can be bypassed if not  defeated. Other kinds 
of evil, real or illusory, although not defeated, are here incisively scrutinized 
and evaluated. Nixon, Cavan asserts, was a development of broad cultural 
forces and local events, who in turn came to dominate those same cultural 
forces through impression management and the manipulation of a collective 
vision of evil. This vision, or "gothic imagery," is, according to Cavan, "a 
vision of life in which good and evil are locked in mortal combat, winner take 
all," and is at the heart of twentieth-century American culture and politics. 
Because it is a collective vision, and because Nixon was able to use and abuse 
that vision according to his desires, American society shares in a collective 
guilt for his success. We created the conditions and forces within which Nixon 
germinated and blossomed, and we gave birth to and nurtured our own ver- 
sion of the "gothic," so we must then bear, however uncomfortably, the guilt 
of our complicity. Cavan arrives at this conclusion through a wide-ranging 
analysis of both Nixon and his cultural milieu, relying upon a variety of 
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social sciences. Her achievement is both instructive and unsatisfactory. Cavan 
views Nixon from a number of  perspectives, but the insights we receive are 
marred as we are never quite sure where precisely these perspectives coalesce. 
In the wake of  bewilderingly rapid technological innovation and change arises 
a cultural version of paranoia, Cavan says. Condensed into a "gothi c vision," 
this fear ascribes extreme malevolence and power to dark forces of  unmitigated 
evil. Only in a kind of Zorastrian or Manichean war between Good and Evil, 
relentlessly fought to the death, lies any hope of salvation. Nixon, as a product 
of the culture that created this image, shared in the collective vision and used 
it to his advantage. Allying himself with the virtuous forces of the Good, he 
perceived his enemies, both real and those he created, as absolute Evil. Ecrasez 
l'infdme became his ceaseless cry for assistance in the universal battle against 
those "out  there" who intend to eradicate us all. In the pohtics of fear he 
thrived in and perpetuated, Nixon was uniquely skillful in his ability to ap- 
propriate, assimilate, and manipulate the "gothic image" through impression 
management and illusory scenarios. "He was," Cavan notes, 
a man who had a deep conviction that forces of evil were loose in the world and would 
destroy all that was good unless they were countered by powers equally ruthless. The 
dramatic clash of good and evil resonated in all he said throughout his entire career. 
This gothic imagery provided the leitmotif of the world view he propagated, and ulti- 
mately it transformed party politics from thesis and antithesis to warfare and sabo- 
tage (155). 
Nixon was our most successful conman of illusions, our very own "gothic 
huckster, the evangelical salesman whose only product was himself" (266). 
Yet the conman or the huckster can only succeed if someone buys his wares. 
Herein hes the collective comphcity in Nixon's rise, Cavan says, for "quite 
simply, the conman can take the mark only if the mark himself has larceny 
in his heart"  (224). The American public was willing to believe the illusions 
Nixon created, and to swallow the solutions he proposed. Nixon succeeded 
as well, Cavan theorizes, because he was at the vanguard of twentieth-century 
thought. His peculiar brand of  self-serving logic, wherein all of his own actions 
were sophistically rationalized, reflected the ultimate influence and assimila- 
tion of relativity and enlightened self-interest turned to evil ends. Such a per- 
version of these endearing American values was natural for Nixon, a man well 
accustomed to betrayal and deceit. Cavan catalogues Nixon's betrayal of his 
parents, his family, his rehgion, his compatriots, his co-conspirators, his party, 
and the trust of  his nation. The legacy of Nixon, Cavan says, closely resembles 
the legacy of Hitler. The cultural strain in America in the 1950s was a New 
World version of that same strain in Germany in the 1920s, and both Nixon 
and Hitler can lay claim to being the true "gothic heroes" of the twentieth 
century. 
Cavan arrives at these and other striking and often outrageous conclusions by 
bringing to bear upon her study of Nixon the insights of various social sciences. 
Her work is a confusing blend of history, political science, sociobiography, 
sociolinguistics, and anthropology. Thus she scrutinizes at a distance Nixon's 
inner sanctum as a cultural anthropologist would observe an alien tribe. From 
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this perspective, Bebe Rebozo seems to function as co-wife, and H. R. Haldeman 
as office husband and mother. Through analysis of the taped White House 
conversations, Cavan ascertains that the conspirators spoke a macho language 
heavily weighted with the metaphors of gangsterism. 20th Century Gothic 
is brimming with such insights, as Cavan shifts from one perspective to another, 
allowing the juxtaposi t ion of divergent approaches to imply and infer connec- 
tions and crossings that have been missed in more narrowly focused studies. 
The scope of the book is sweeping; we are carried along in almost one breath 
f r rm gargoyles on the parapets of Medieval cathedrals to mushroom clouds, 
and from the Renaissance chivalric code to popular novels of evangelical 
hucksterism. We are propelled into the broad forces of  historical and cultural 
change, finding ourselves immersed in Nixon's world. And so we must be, if 
Cavan's theory is correct, for Nixon's world must perforce be our world. His 
illusions, fantasies, and fears are interchangeable with ours. He is, was, and 
ever shall be "America's Nixon".  
There is, however, a central methodological difficulty with Cavan's book,  
which mutes the force of her arguments. Juxtaposing social scientific ap- 
proaches and theories is enlightening, but their relationship with one another 
9 is not  wholly or satisfactorily clear. The anthropological perspective is sugges- 
tive, but the First Family is not  an alien tribe; rather, according to Cavan's 
own thesis, Nixon and family are, as Marlowe said of Lord Jim, "one of us". 
Cavan herself seems startled by some of her conclusions, for while she notes 
the gangster language of the Oval Office, she notes also that not  everyone in 
the society uses such language, even though our culture "is organized in such 
a way that what was once considered criminalis now common practice" (251, 
her emphasis). In other words, there was something fundamentally different 
about  the Nixon circle, which Cavan does not  quite capture. He may not  in 
fact have been "one of us". Too often the cultural forces Cavan describes are 
too broad to be of any particular use in ascertaining Nixon's uniqueness, and 
the localized events in his life point  more towards his own quirkiness than to 
his place in the mainstream of American culture. As well, Cavan's section on 
sociolinguistics is her weakest; by editing the Nixon transcripts (" to  facilitate 
reading"), Cavan robs herself of the opportuni ty to strengthen her case. The 
"hems" and ~'haws," the circumlocutions, the redundancies, and the long 
pauses that she has edited out are of utmost importance in any study of 
Nixonian language. They demonstrate how deeply ingrained were obfuscation 
and deliberate ambiguity in all aspects of the presidential coterie. Silences are 
especiaUy communicative; consider, for example, how much is communicated 
through the gaps in a Chekovian dialogue. These shortcomings - of intermin- 
gled perspectives and condensed protocols - do not  destroy Cavan's argu- 
ments, but they unnecessarily weaken them. 20th Century Gothic is more 
suggestive than convincing. 
Dale Woolery 
Washington University 
Accounting for Genocide : National Responses and Jewish Victimization during 
the Holocaust by Helen Fein (New York: The Free Press, 1979). 
No single event has engendered more fervent or emotionally laden research 
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than the Holocaust. Research has been dominated by conventional historical 
exposition of what happened,  when, where and why with the aim of assessing 
responsibility. Previous studies have usually focused on Nazi policies, the ex- 
tent  of  domestic collaboration, and Jewish non-resistance. Recently, however, 
the sociologist Helen Fein has broken out of the confines of tradit ional his- 
torical analysis which emphasizes the uniqueness of these events and their 
underlying causes. In Accounting for Genocide Fein uses comparative and sta- 
tistical analyses to reevaluate the impact of these and other factors. She syn- 
thesizes previous work into an original theoretic framework that  goes beyond 
the assessment of blame, beyond the particulars of Europe's darkest hour to- 
ward a general understanding of political cruelty. Fein's major theoretic in- 
terest is the structural conditions of genocide. She asserts that groups excluded 
from a pol i ty 's  "universe of obligation" (i.e., lacking solidary bonds to the 
politically dominant group) are vulnerable to genocide. However, genocide 
can be implemented only if the international setting insulates a state from 
external interference and if, internally, the vulnerable group cannot forge al- 
liances which will enable it to evade capture. 
She begins by comparing the Turkish massacre of Armenians during World 
War I and the Nazi extermination of European Jewry in World War II. Her 
comparative analysis is remarkably similar to recent work on world-systems 
theory.  (1) Both victimized groups comprised a middleman minori ty in states 
at the periphery of the world system. Their economic role in these states made 
them particularly vulnerable to competi t ion from rising groups. (2) Both 
groups were desired as middlemen precisely because they lacked a native 
political base. From the start they were excluded from the national universe 
of obligation. (3) In both cases genocide was part of  the creation of the state 
order being forged by a new political elite. Wars provided the opportuni ty  to 
act against a vulnerable group by insulating the Young Turks and the Nazis 
from external interference. Interestingly, Fein generates this analysis from a 
Durkheimian value-consensus theory emphasizing universes of obligation, 
whereas world-systems theorists begin with a marxist-weberian framework 
emphasizing structural relationships. Thus despite her interest in the struc- 
tural conditions of genocide, Fein focuses on the inter-group attitudes that 
emerge during the formation of nation-states rather than on the relative power 
and resources of different groups. Nevertheless, like analysts such as Waller- 
stein and Skocpol, Fein stresses that the international setting affects oppor- 
tunity structures.nnpinging upon various groups acting within smaller political 
structures. Moreover, Fein also notes that a state's position in the world system 
affects inter-group relations within it. But whereas Wallerstein and Skocpol 
emphasize structural relations be tween  groups, particularly class relations, 
Fein focuses on group att i tudes and solidary bonds. 
This cross-case comparison, however, illuminates only the conditions affecting 
a group's vulnerability, and some of the conditions allowing a state to imple- 
ment  genocide policies. An in-depth study of the Holocaust allows for a cross- 
state comparison of  the conditions for successful implementation of genocide. 
The Holocaust occurred with the cooperation of  political structures that varied 
across Europe and with differing degrees of success. Rather than assuming 
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that Nazi policies were the exclusive determinant of the Holocaust, Fein 
examines the characteristics of the political communities which implemented 
them. She notes that the percentage of Jews "victimized" (i.e., killed directly 
or indirectly, or interned in concentration camps) varies from over 95% (in 
Poland) to less than 1% (in Finland). Using regression analysis, she sets out to 
explain this variation and thus to determine the conditions under which 
genocide can be successfully implemented. Her study encompasses all of 
Nazi-dominated Europe (22 states and political units)except the Soviet Union 
(for which suitable data were unavailable) and countries with small prewar 
Jewish populations (e.g., Luxembourg). Her major finding is that where Nazi 
control was strongest the victimization rates were highest. But elsewhere the 
victimization rates were determined by the level of prewar anti-Semitism. 
These two causes alone explain most (86%) of the variation in Jewish victimi- 
zation. Commonly offered explanatory factors such as local variation in Nazi 
directives, Jewish responses, and domestic collaboration were also affected by 
these independent variables and are analyzed as intervening variables. 
Fein's model of the process of genocide therefore provides a powerful frame- 
work for reevaluating and synthesizing previous work. Exclusion of Jews 
from the national universe of obligation, indicated by the presence of success- 
ful prewar anti-Semitic movements and the absence of rigorous government 
responses to protect the civil rights and liberties of Jews, accounts for high 
levels of state cooperation in implementing Nazi policies of anti-Jewish dis- 
crimination. Indeed, the Nazis relied upon this cooperation - except in those 
areas subjected to total control. Hence, high state cooperation led to the de 
facto social segregation of Jews. Once this was accomplished it was relatively 
easy to physically isolate Jews, and once Jews were isolated their fate was vir- 
tually sealed. This is represented in the following diagram, showing zero-order 
correlations between the variables (354): 
Anti- 
Semitic 0.69 High state 0.82 Jews 0.91 Jews 0.92 Rank 
9 ~ Cooperation in anti- ~ segregated ~ isolated ~ Jewish movement 
Jewish discrimination victims 
1936 
This analysis calls traditional interpretation into question. First, Jewish vic- 
timization is related to a polity's willingness to segregate and isolate Jews - 
and not necessarily to its desire to get rid of them. Second, Nazi domination 
created new opportunities for anti-Semitic states to take even harsher actions 
against the Jews than they could before the war. Thus the importance of Nazi 
policy extends be3~ond its impact on Nazi actions; it also catalyzed state 
cooperation. Third, factors that inhibited state cooperation in discriminating 
against Jews increased their life-chances. Church protests and steps on behalf 
of Jews by resistance movements or by exiled leaders could lower the victimi- 
zation rate (except where Nazi control was most intense). The effect of inter- 
vening factors is clearly demonstrated in Fein's treatment of the two excep- 
tional cases, the Netherlands and Rumania. Despite the low level of anti- 
Semitism in the Netherlands the victimization rate was almost 80%. There 
was a high degree of cooperation by the Dutch civil service bureaucracy which 
continued mechanically to implement orders from above. Neither the Dutch 
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Reformed Church nor the government-in-exile exerted their leadership to 
encourage non-compliance. Moreover, Dutch social institutions initially ac- 
commodated the Nazi occupiers. This response was mirrored in the Jewish 
community because successful Jewish social defense movements required the 
cooperation of non-Jewish social defense networks, which were either non- 
existent or poorly organized until after half the Dutch Jewry had already 
been deported. Anti-Semitic Rumania, on the other hand, began liquidating 
its Jews even before explicit Nazi orders were given. Nevertheless, as Germany's 
defeat became imminent Rumania tried to extricate itself from the Axis and 
reversed its policy of state cooperation. This belated resistance was supported 
by both the state and the Church in order to minimize the expected postwar 
backlash from the apparent victors. The victimization rate in Rumania was 
under 60%. 
Fein's sociological model of a process occurring over time explains both the 
general pattern and the exceptions because she accounts for variation in the 
crucial intervening processes. This strength is further highlighted in her analy- 
sis of church actions. She finds that church protests could indeed reduce the 
victimization rates. In those areas with the least amount of Nazi control, 
positive church statements deterred collaboration and instigated cooperation 
with Jewish social defense movements. Fein extends her regression analysis 
to explain the various responses by the dominant church in each state to anti- 
Jewish policies. Whether the dominant church in a nation protested against 
the deportation of Jews was, according to Fein, a function of religion, the 
extent of Nazi control, the political history of a state, and the extent of anti- 
Semitism. Where Nazi control was exerted through indigenous institutions, 
Roman Catholic churches were less likely to protest than Protestant or 
Orthodox churches. On one hand, there was a high correlation between anti- 
Semitism and the predominance of Catholicism. On the other hand, Catholic 
states were frequently those states created after World War I, or, in the cases 
of Croatia and Slovakia, created by the Nazis during World War II. Thus non- 
Catholic churches in older states where prewar anti-Semitic movements were 
the least successful were most likely to protest. Church protest was totally 
absent in nations subjected to the most intense Nazi control and in other 
predominantly Catholic states where anti-Semitism was high (and which 
were also formed since World War I). Moreover, Fein assesses how church 
protests affected victimization rates. They reduced the extent of state coop- 
eration and facilitated the~extension of social defense networks to Jews. 
Because Fein goes beyond an examination of any particular church and ana- 
lyzes the effects of different historical and structural characteristics of states 
on church actions, she significantly contributes towards resolving this his- 
torical controversy. Her research design does not, however, allow her to 
examine the importance of the anti-Semitism net of the political peculiari- 
ties of the newly formed Catholic states. Nevertheless, she raises this as an 
important question for future research. Conventional history could not even 
specify the nature of this problem. 
Fein also contributes to the debate on the effect of cooperation by the 
Judenrd'te (Jewish Councils) on the fate of the Jews, which has centered 
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around the validity of the Arendt thesis. To implement the Final Solution, 
Arendt argues, the Nazis required the cooperation of the Judenrdte, which 
administered and policed Jewish communities and frequently rounded up 
Jews for deportation to the death camps. Critiques of Arendt's work have 
focused upon her factual errors, or have tried to explain why the Judenrdte 
cooperated, either by tracing the long history of successful accommodation 
by Jewish communities to hostile governments, or by demonstrating the 
"rationality" of certain decisions given the knowledge of circumstances and 
alternatives available to them. None have been able to assess the net effects 
of Judenrat actions upon the ultimate fate of the Jews. Fein analyzes the 
causes and consequences of Judenrat cooperation in deporting Jews within 
the context of how Jews became victims in each polity. First, non-Jewish 
resistance decreased the likelihood of a Judenrat being established. Second, 
Judenrat cooperation was most likely where Jews had been isolated and con- 
sequently virtually all alternatives were closed. Where a Judenrat was estab- 
lished and the state did not cooperate or resistance movements aided the 
Jews, Judenrat accommodation was less likely. From these findings, Fein 
estimates the effect of Judenrat cooperation and separates the effects of the 
extermination process from its causes. Judenrat cooperation in the deporta- 
tion of Jews led neither to the isolation of the Jews nor to greater victimiza- 
tion. Rather, isolation was a cause of both. Fein shows that Arendt correctly 
ascertained the necessity of local cooperation for the implementation of the 
Final Solution, but that she mistakenly stressed the role of Jewish institutions. 
Implementation was facilitated primarily by non-Jewish cooperation in the 
early stages of the genocide process. Jewish responses were largely determined 
by non-Jewish responses. 
In addition, Fein's analysis suggests that if Judenrat cooperation prior to the 
deportations (e.g., the administration and policing of the ghettos in accor- 
dance with Nazi directives) increased the victimization rate, this was probably 
because it facilitated segregation. Some Judenrd'te probably prevented the 
emergence of Jewish leaders and "activist" organizations which might have 
been able to enlist outside support. In other words, Judenrat actions after 
ghettoization 'probably had no significant adverse impact upon the ultimate 
victimization rate. Thus Fein challenges both the Arendt thesis and the 
majority of other studies that have focused on the Judenrdte in Eastern 
Europe. Such studies are certainly valuable for understanding the dynamics 
of ghetto life, but they are misdirected when trying to determine the causes 
of Jewish victimization. Fein does more than identify the structural deter- 
minants of the various stages of the extermination process. She evaluates some 
of the hypotheses of those historians upon whose scholarship and archival 
research she relied. She discounts the importance of the length of warning 
time available for mobilizing resistance to the Final Sol.ution as an explanation 
of Nazi success. The most effective strategy for the Jews was evasion of the 
Nazi net. Because this strategy could be successful only where Jewish social 
defense movements established non-Jewish allies, warning time accounted for 
much less variation than factors influencing non-Jewish responses to Nazi 
control. Different states reacted differently: some adjusted to the new condi- 
tions while simultaneously using the available time to help the Jews evade 
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deportation; others did not  use the time available; and still others facilitated 
the execution of the Final Solution. 
Fein also rejects historical interpretations claiming that Jewish demographic 
characteristics, such as their percentage of the population, absolute size, or 
extent of concentration in urban areas, are causally related to the victimiza- 
tion rate. Demographic characteristics account for little variation in victimi- 
zation rates. Jew's social position and the nature of their communal organi- 
zation were far more important. Specifically, the relationship between 
Jewish and non-Jewish organizations and communal institutions is the relevant 
set of variables. First, the willingness of a polity to cooperate in the discrimi- 
nation of Jews is a function of the type of competition between ethnic and 
occupational groups which emerges in each society and of the position of 
the Jews within both the social structure and the organizations involved in 
the competitive struggle. Thus, for example, in the Balkan states carved out 
of the Ottoman empire, Jews were only one of several ethnic groups (e.g., 
Armenians, Greeks, Syrian Christians) overrepresented in middleman occupa- 
tions and roles. Hence the Jews were less salient and, as a group, less apt to 
be the primary target of those competing for entry into these social positions. 
Second, a state's position in the world economy affects this competition and 
the nature of the resultant discrimination against minorities. This suggests a 
need to reexamine the effect of the interwar economic crises upon the posi- 
tion of various states (including Germany) in the world-capitalist system and 
how this affected the nature of intergroup relations within each state - 
especially the new violent expressions of anti-Semitism. Third, avoiding vic- 
timization was related to the ability of the Jewish leadership to mobilize 
social defense networks in cooperation with non-Jewish allies. Thus the struc- 
ture of the Jewish community and the characteristics of inter-group relations - 
rather than demographic factors - were the crucial variables. 
Accounting for Genocide exemplifies the contribution sociology can make to 
Holocaust studies. Fein tested some of the hypotheses of previous research, 
was able to support some explanations, reject others, and specify how yet 
others remain problematic. She formulated new explanations derived from 
her theoretic framewoi"k of the nature of nation-states and from statistical 
inferences about the relationships between several variables. Moreover, her 
application of statistical controls to factors influencing historical processes 
affects the agenda for future research. Certainly Fein has demonstrated the 
necessity for rigorous comparative studies of genocide in order to further 
explicate the impact of the international setting upon political processes 
within nation-states that make groups vulnerable to genocide. Furthermore, 
determinants of competition between political actors - including the state 
itself - need to be further explained. How does this competition affect re- 
sponses to the Nazis? Do different forms of competition lead to different 
consequences under different conditions of Nazi rule? These questions call 
attention to the limitations of the value-consensus approach. Fein is of course 
correct to focus on how the characteristics of the different polities affected 
the success of Nazi genocide. But her theoretic conception of states causes 
her to overlook many of these. First, as noted above, her Durkheimian ap- 
462 
proach ignores the relative power and resources of different groups within 
the state. But these structural factors are as important as the international 
setting in creating opportunity structures for implementing genocide. Conse- 
quently, Fein has little to say about how anti-Semitism among non-dominant 
political actors (including both ethnic groups and churches) affected the fate 
of Jews. France, for example, is classified as a "low" anti-Semitic state (simi- 
lar to Denmark, Belgium, and Finland) because prewar governments acted 
against anti-Semitic movements. Nevertheless, the advent of the Vichy govern- 
ment certainly provided new opportunities to traditionally anti-Semitic polit- 
ical actors. Fein cannot, however, estimate how changes in the power rela- 
tions between groups affected the propensity to cooperate with the Nazis, or 
the ability of Jews to establish contacts with the resistance, or the likelihood 
that the Catholic church would actively protest against the deportations. 
Second, Fein notes that middleman minorities are particularly vulnerable be- 
cause of the willingness of various groups to gain economic advantages by 
discriminating against them. Those who might gain from the discrimination 
against such minorities are not necessarily the dominant groups. Never- 
theless, the Nazis could enlist their cooperation, especially if they were strate- 
gically placed within part of the state bureaucracy and/or local governments. 
A model accounting for organizational competition for power and resources 
and which relates this to the social and political structure of each state would 
be less abstract and more powerful than Fein's model which stresses groups' 
attitudes to each other. Rather than being universes of obligation, nation- 
states can be seen as arenas for the competition of groups for resources. Such 
an approach would force us to ask how anti-Semitism led to state cooperation; 
or rather, to the cooperation of strategically placed groups within the state. It 
would also force us to explore the dynamics of simultaneous cooperation by 
some groups and the formation of underground escape networks by others. 
Fein's model merely indicates some of the causes of cooperative state and 
church attitudes. Still, Fein's sociological study contributes much to our 
understanding of how genocide has been implemented in the twentieth cen- 
tury. Fein's study is unique because it merges a theory of how a particular 
group becomes vulnerable to genocide with an analysis of the international 
variation in victimization rates. Thus she forsakes the traditional units of 
analysis - either the perpetrators or the victims - and studies the political 
communities subject to Nazi pressures. She can therefore examine the inter- 
action of various groups and relate this to the conditions that provided the 
opportunity successfully to exterminate the Jews. The result is a scholarly 
and original treatment of the relationships between the characteristics of the 
social and political structures of states and genocide. Holocaust scholars will 
have to treat seriously her findings and inferences and thus begin to incor- 
porate the sociological perspective into their work. 
Why, however, has it taken so long for a serious and comprehensive sociolog- 
ical treatment of the Holocaust to appear? Is it because the primary sources 
are hidden in the mysterious comers of archives where historians have staked 
their territorial claims? Is it because those historians uniquely qualified be- 
cause of their mastery of several European languages are not trained in socio- 
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logical methods? Only partly. The exclusion of sociology from Holocaust 
studies also stems from an unacknowledged fear that the quantitative analysis 
of theoretical propositions will somehow defile and desecrate this tragic 
experience (Cf. Irving L. Horowitz's review in Contemporary Sociology, 9;4, 
which expresses this fear). Conventional historians discuss the unique features 
of the Holocaust, thus separating it from the mundane. This is good conven- 
tional history - filled with the pathos of a scholar trying to feel and penetrate 
a trauma locked behind the walls of time. Fein has shown, however, that 
sociological methods can certainly be sensitive to the texture of historical 
events and human suffering. She used statistics to put order into chaos. By 
critiquing competing interpretations of how and why the Nazis were able to 
implement their racial policies against the Jews, she has furthered our under- 
standing of how the Jews became victims. 
Benfamin M. Ben-Baruch 
University of Michigan 
Freud, Biologist of the Mind by Frank Sulloway (New York: Basic Books, 
1979). 
The development of Sigmund Freud's ideas has been shrouded in a dense 
mythology, argues Frank Sulloway in his much discussed Freud, Biologist of 
the Mind, a mythology begun by Freud himself and sustained by orthodox 
psychoanalysis. Sulloway seeks to dispel this mythology and uncover the 
"real" Freud hidden behind it. The result is a well-researched, enlightening, 
but ultimately paradoxical work: Sulloway painstakingly exhumes a "Freud" 
about whom one can only muse as a historical curiosity and then quickly 
rebury. 
The critical period in Freud's intellectual development ran from 1895 until  
roughly 1909 - or from the break with Josef Breuer, his collaborator on the 
early hysteria studies, until Freud's visit to the United States, which confirmed 
the growing public recognition of psychoanalysis. During this time, Freud put 
together psychoanalytic theory in its basic form and wrote his classic works 
on dreams, jokes, the psychopathology of everyday life, and sexuality. 
According to the familiar orthodox account, Freud labored in isolation against 
an indifferent and often hostile world to create a fundamentally original 
theory - a pure.psychology that decisively broke with.established biological 
theories of mind. Through careful research and self-analysis, he discovered the 
existence of infantile sexuality, in all its polymorphous perversity, and con- 
structed his theory of neurosis thereon. Freud thus had appeared as the proto- 
type of the independent,  empirical, embattled scientific hero. 
Sulloway convincingly challenges this picture of Freud's intellectually forma- 
tive years on all counts. Freud, he shows, never labored in total isolation; he 
always had at least a few intellectual intimates, primary among whom was 
Wilhelm Fliess, that enigmatic figure so readily dismissed by orthodox psy- 
choanalysis as a quack. Sulloway demonstrates that Fliess's ideas were respect- 
able at the time and that he anticipated several of Freud's most important 
"discoveries". Similarly, the negative response to Freud's work has been 
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grossly exaggerated: Sulloway calls upon written reviews and the minutes of 
professional meetings to show that Freud's  work on hysteria, dreams, and 
sexuality all received substantial attention, much of it positive. Psychoanalytic 
theory, moreover, was n o t  a great rupture with the established wisdom of the 
day. To the contrary,  it was strongly rooted in contemporary biology and 
sexology; even the notion of infantile sexuality, far from being invented by 
Freud, was quite familiar at the time. As a result, psychoanalysis is not  the 
pure psychology that  its adherents (including Freud himself) have claimed. It 
is a "psychobiology" whose biological dimension is essential. 
What is the biological element in Freud? Like many of his contemporaries, 
Freud advocated a "biogenetic" thesis and a Lamarckian view of evolution. 
That is, he believed that the development of the individual repeated the evolu- 
tion of the species (ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny) and that this evolution 
proceeded through the inheritance of acquired traits. According to Freud, 
human evolution and the growth of civilization involved renunciation of a 
series of instinctual satisfactions incompatible with these developments. 
Originating as psychical defenses, these renunciations somehow became incor- 
porated into humanity 's  genetic endowment and thus became organic. The 
psychosexual development of the individual is an organically determined 
repetit ion of this phylogenetic process, passing through a similar set of 
instinctual renunciations. This biogenetic thesis was the bedrock upon which 
Freud anchored his notion of infantile sexuality, its polymorphous nature,  its 
progression through an ironclad set of stages, and hence his theory of repres- 
sion and neurosis. It also underlies Freud's  work on culture as well as his 
later theory of the instincts. Those biogenetic ideas that readers of Freud find 
so perplexing and inexplicable are thus not at all incidental, according to 
Sulloway; they are a systematic part of Freud's  work and do not diminish in 
his later writings. Although Freud often protested that  he was leaving biology 
behind, he took it wherever he went. 
Having exposed the myths of psychoanalysis, Sulloway at tempts to explain 
why they were created in the first place. If Freud was in truth a "psycho- 
biologist," why did he and his followers regularly claim that these theories 
broke decisively with biology? If Freud was not an isolated, embattled figure 
in those formative years, why did he (in his autobiography and elsewhere) 
claim that he was? Sulloway argues that these twin myths lie at " the  heart of 
the epistemological politics that have pervaded the entire psychoanalytic 
revolution" (488). By picturing psychoanalysis as rooted wholly in a new set 
of empirical discoveries based on a distinctive psychoanalytic methodology 
rather than in previous theories of the mind, these myths provided psycho- 
analysis with special claims to both autonomy from other sciences and a dis- 
tinctive kind of knowledge unavailable to those without psychoanalytic 
training. They thus enabled the new science to legitimate itself and to invali- 
date its critics. Any .effort to disprove psychoanalytic ideas or to assimilate 
them to other disciplines could be met with the argument that these ideas 
were rooted in a unique theory, methodology,  and body of data that the 
uninitiated were not qualified to judge. Far from being unique to psycho- 
analysis, Sulloway suggests, this myth-making process is characteristic of 
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science in general. New scientific paradigms often shroud themselves in an 
empiricist myth by placing their origins in the work of an isolated investigator 
who through pure observation (freed from the weight of previous theory) 
reaches a sudden inspiration that leads to wholly new ideas. As a result, our 
idea of science is furnished with images of Galileo atop the Tower of Pisa, 
Newton under his apple tree, and Sigmund Freud discovering his own infantile 
sexuality. In fact, Sulloway argues, the emergence of new scientific para- 
digms occurs in a more collective, less abrupt way. 
Sulloway's claim that Freudian theory is a psychobiology actually involves 
two related, but distinct arguments of unequal cogency. On the one hand, 
Sulloway presents an intellectual biography of Freud, which attempts to 
identify the historical roots  of Freudian theory. On the other hand, he 
provides an interpretation of Freud's texts, which attempts to clarify the con- 
t en t  of Freudian theory. These two issues, roots and content, are quite differ- 
ent: it is one thing to argue that Freud's ideas originate in certain strands of 
late nineteenth-century biology; it is another to argue that these ideas them- 
selves are inextricably biological. Sulloway convincingly claims that Freudian 
theory is roo ted  in certain biogenetic and Lamarckian notions and that the 
idea of infantile sexuality was not invented by Freud, but was a widely 
accepted notion. He provides a plausible explanation of why orthodox psycho- 
analysis and its official biographers would systematically mystify these roots, 
and the implications of his argument for the historically inclined are clear. 
His arguments about the c o n t e n t  of Freudian theory, however, are much less 
convincing and complete: It is not clear that psychoanalysis in itself - 
whatever its roots - is simply a "psychobiology". Sulloway does not ade- 
quately explain why the biological content of Freudian theory - whatever its 
importance - has been so roundly ignored. Finally, he does not spell out the 
implications of his re-reading of Freud as psychobiology for those who would 
make use of Freud's ideas. 
To be sure, Sulloway's interpretation of the Freudian texts contains an 
important kernel of truth: biogenetic, Lamarckian, and other biological ideas 
play a systematic role throughout Freud's work. Their presence is neither 
haphazard nor limited to earlier writings. Any reading of Freud not recog- 
nizing this presence is doomed to incomprehension, and the value of Sullo- 
way's work lies precisely in calling the serious reader's attention to the consis- 
tent biological element in Freud. Sulloway, however, argues that this biolog- 
ical element is not only systematic but also central and essential; that bio- 
genetic explanations of sexuality, neurosis, and repression are the only ones 
Freud offers; and hence that Freudian thought is pure ly  psychobiological. 
Sulloway never supports these more radical contentions: he merely shows 
that one can do a convincing psychobiological reading of Freud, not that the 
psychobiological reading is the only  convincing one. Indeed, he does not 
confront alternative readings of Freud from the perspectives of sociology, 
linguistics, hermeneutics, or critical theory. Sulloway sticks narrowly to the 
orthodox psychoanalytic literature and thus does not cQnsider the most 
interesting, non-orthodox interpretations of Freud. There is no mention of 
Paul Ricoeur, Norman O. Brown, Herbert Marcuse, Philip Rieff, Talcott 
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Parsons, Juliet Mitchell, Jtirgen Habermas, or Jacques Lacan. Sulloway thus 
does not even have an adequate conceptual framework for assessing the 
relative merit of an exclusively psychobiological reading of Freud. He does 
not allow us to inquire whether the systematic presence of biogenetic notions 
in Freud is a necessary foundation or a superfluous scaffolding; or to look at 
it another way, whether Freud speaks in one tongue or in many. 
Freud was not exclusively a psychobiologist - or anything else for that 
matter. His discourse was ambiguous and open-ended, because he had no one 
set of concepts that adequately captured what he strove to say. Biogenetic 
notions are present, but they do not monopolize the discussion. Consider, for 
example, Freud's attempt to explain instinctual repression in Civilization and 
its D i scon t en t s .  Searching for the biological element in Freud, Sulloway looks 
almost exclusively at those footnotes where Freud gives an "organic" account 
of repression. Freud there argues that the human evolutionary achievement of 
erect posture required the renunciation of those instinctual gratifications 
associated with olfactory stimuli, anal eroticism, and so on. Thus sexual 
repression can be seen as an organic defense against an earlier stage of animal 
existence. Sulloway's work helps us understand that this biogenetic argument 
is not simply an inexplicable aside, but reflects certain abiding features of 
Freud's thought. In focusing on these few footnotes, however, Sulloway 
ignores the wider argument being made in Civilization and its D i s c o n t e n t s  - 
an argument that links sexual repression not to biology but to a specific inter- 
action between society and the instincts. There are, then, at least two quite 
different explanations of repression in this work, but Sulloway sees only one. 
The ambiguity and open-endedness of Freudian discourse is also manifested 
in Freud's ambivalence about the biological content of his own theories: even 
though Freud consistently brought biogenetic notions into his writing, he 
as consistently denied that this thought had any biological elements. His work 
is full of protests that he has left biology behind. Sulloway argues that these 
anti-biological protestations are a tactical manuever on Freud's part to estab- 
lish the autonomy of psychoanalysis and distinguish it from previous theories. 
He thus reduces the contradiction to a simple process of mystification. It 
seems more probable that the contradict ion reflects a real tension within 
Freudian thought: Freud struggled with his biological concepts, sensed their 
inadequacy, and sought to transcend them. He never fully succeeded, how- 
ever, and biological formulations thus co-exist in his thought with non- 
biological ones. 
Putting psychobiology at the heart of Freudian thought (rather than seeing it 
as one element in that complex set of ideas) is not merely implausible, it also 
creates a puzzle that Sulloway does not adequately solve. If the biological 
content is so central to Freud, why has it been so roundly ignored? Sullo- 
way does not realize that accounting for this is quite different from explaining 
why Freud's ~ biological roots  have been obscured. The latter is a relatively 
esoteric issue of intellectual biography and thus can l~e explained in terms of 
the epistemological politics of the orthodox psychoanalytic movement, which 
has dominated the biographical work on Freud. Such a narrow explanation 
will not do for the issue of content. The interpretation of Freud's writings, 
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as opposed to the investigation of his intellectual roots, has not been so 
successfully dominated by the psychoanalytic movement. Freud's texts are 
there for everyone to read, and just about everyone reads them in his own 
way. What must be explained therefore is not simply why the psychoanalytic 
movement has ignored the biological content of Freudian thought, but why 
a wide spectrum of thinkers, most not influenced by orthodox psychoanalysis, 
also have done so. Here a narrow focus on the psychoanalytic movement 
hampers Sulloway again: because he looks exclusively at orthodox readings of 
Freud, he never thinks to ask why most of the unorthodox and the anti- 
orthodox have made the same "mistake". 
Strikingly, SuUoway's psychobiological reading of Freud seems to lead no- 
where; its intellectual implications are nil. Usually when a scholar goes to 
great length to revise our idea of what some eminent thinker "really" said, 
he has some wider point to make; he wants to reorient our thinking about the 
world in some significant way. Surprisingly, Sulloway makes no such effort. 
After spending 500 pages arguing that Freud is a psychobiologist, he fails to 
show how this new reading of Freud provides us with fresh and fruitful 
insights into the psyche. Indeed, he tells us that the Freud he has so pain- 
stakingly unearthed is not of much intellectual value to us at all: "Freud's 
theories reflect the faulty logic of outmoded nineteenth-century biological 
assumptions, particularly those of a psychophysicalist, Lamarckian, and 
biogenetic nature . . . .  Much that is wrong with orthodox psychoanalysis may 
be traced directly back to them" (497-498) .  Those odd notions about 
ontogeny recapitulating phylogeny and about the inheritance of acquired 
traits lost their popularity by the 1920s, and Sulloway is certainly loath to 
resuscitate them. At the same time, however, Sulloway does not want to 
dismiss either Freud or psychobiology. Freud, he assures us, did have some- 
thing important to say, and a refined, updated psychobiology is the best bet 
for capturing it. Sulloway does not tell us, however, what this important 
something is or why a new psychobiology would fare better than the old. 
Indeed, he does not convincingly demonstrate what to make of this psycho- 
biological Freud at all. 
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